



US009467863B2

(12) **United States Patent**  
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(10) **Patent No.:** **US 9,467,863 B2**

(45) **Date of Patent:** **Oct. 11, 2016**

(54) **DETECTION OF SPOOF ATTACKS ON LOCATION BROADCASTING BEACONS**

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(\* ) Notice: Subject to any disclaimer, the term of this patent is extended or adjusted under 35 U.S.C. 154(b) by 48 days.

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(21) Appl. No.: **14/515,508**

(57) **ABSTRACT**

(22) Filed: **Oct. 15, 2014**

Spoof attacks on location based beacons are detected. A stream of beacons (e.g., IBEACONS) comprising at least a unique source identifier is generated. The stream of beacons is broadcast over a wireless communication channel to mobile devices within range. A list of broadcasted beacons is stored in a table along with a time and location of broadcast. Subsequent to broadcasting, a stream of beacons is detected. The detected beacon stream comprises a unique source identifier along with a time and a location of broadcast. The unique source identifier, the time and the location of at least one beacon of the detected beacon stream can be compared to the unique source identifier, the time and the location of at least one beacon of the broadcast beacon stream. Responsive to a match between the unique source identifiers and a mismatch of at least one of the time and locations, it is determined that the broadcast beacon stream has been spoofed by the detected beacon stream. Once a spoof has been detected, various remediation actions can be taken, such as sending alerts to admin, cautioning end users, and other security mode procedures.

(65) **Prior Publication Data**

US 2016/0112878 A1 Apr. 21, 2016

(51) **Int. Cl.**

**H04W 12/12** (2009.01)

**H04L 29/06** (2006.01)

**H04W 84/12** (2009.01)

(52) **U.S. Cl.**

CPC ..... **H04W 12/12** (2013.01); **H04L 63/1416** (2013.01); **H04W 84/12** (2013.01)

(58) **Field of Classification Search**

None

See application file for complete search history.


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
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**11 Claims, 4 Drawing Sheets**


400



100



**FIG. 1**



**FIG. 2**

**300**

UUID	Time	Location	Count
1	<timestamp of the transmission>	Campus/building/floor/(x,y)	# times dummy iBeacon is transmitted

**FIG. 3**

400




FIG. 4




FIG. 5

1

## DETECTION OF SPOOF ATTACKS ON LOCATION BROADCASTING BEACONS

### FIELD OF THE INVENTION

The invention relates generally to wireless computer networking, and more specifically, detecting spoof attacks on location broadcasting beacons.

### BACKGROUND

The introduction of low cost location broadcasting beacon devices further opens the door for the IoT (Internet of Things). One of these devices attached to everyday physical objects bridges the vast amount of Internet information about the objects to end users with smart phones or other device receiving the beacons. The objects can also become the subject of e-commerce by automatically configuring a purchase for a nearby end user. Furthermore, the devices broadcast a location that is useful for tracking a moving object and for non-GPS location services.

The openness of these systems, many of which are unencrypted and do not require authentication credentials, is also a major vulnerability. These systems are relatively easy to spoof and can confuse a user as to which information is legitimate, especially during an e-commerce transaction involving sensitive personal data.

What is needed is a robust technique to enhance the security of location broadcasting beacons by detecting and warning of spoof attacks.

### SUMMARY

These shortcomings are addressed by the present disclosure of methods, computer program products, and systems for detecting spoof attacks on location broadcasting beacons.

In one embodiment, a stream of dummy beacons (e.g., dummy IBEACONS) comprising at least a unique source identifier is generated. The stream of beacons is broadcast over a wireless communication channel to mobile devices within range. A list of broadcasted beacons is stored in a table along with a time and location of broadcast.

In an embodiment, subsequent to broadcasting, a stream of beacons is detected. The detected beacon stream comprises a unique source identifier along with a time and a location of broadcast. The unique source identifier, the time and the location of at least one beacon of the detected beacon stream can be compared to the unique source identifier, the time and the location of at least one beacon of the broadcast beacon stream. Responsive to a match between the unique source identifiers and a mismatch of at least one of the time and locations, it is determined that the broadcast beacon stream has been spoofed by the detected beacon stream.

Once a spoof has been detected, various remediation actions can be taken, such as sending alerts to admin, cautioning end users, and other security mode procedures.

Advantageously, security is enhanced for location broadcasting services.

### BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

In the following drawings, like reference numbers are used to refer to like elements. Although the following figures depict various examples of the invention, the invention is not limited to the examples depicted in the figures.

2

FIG. 1 is a high-level block diagram illustrating a system to detect spoof attacks of location broadcasting beacons, according to one embodiment.

FIG. 2 is a more detailed block diagram illustrating a wireless networking device of the system of FIG. 1, according to one embodiment.

FIG. 3 is a sample table to track a broadcast stream of beacons for comparison to detected streams of beacons, according to one embodiment.

FIG. 4 is a high-level flow diagram illustrating a method for detecting spoof attacks of location broadcasting beacons, according to one embodiment.

FIG. 5 is a block diagram illustrating an exemplary computing device, according to one embodiment.

### DETAILED DESCRIPTION

The present invention provides methods, computer program products, and systems for detecting spoof attacks on location broadcasting beacons. One of ordinary skill in the art will recognize that many other scenarios are possible, as discussed in more detail below.

Systems to Detect Spoof Attacks on Location Broadcasting Beacons (FIG. 1-3)

FIG. 1 is a high-level block diagram illustrating a system **100** to detect spoof attacks of location broadcasting beacons. The system **100** comprises a beacon device **110**, mobile device **115**, a spoofing beacon device **120**, and wireless networking device **130**. The beacon device **110** has an RF (Radio Frequency) range **111**, spoofing beacon device **120** has an RF range **121**, and wireless networking device **130** has an RF range **131**. Mobile device **115** can be wirelessly coupled **135** to a network **199** (e.g., data or cellular network, Internet, LAN, etc.). Other embodiments of communication channels for system **100** are possible with additional components.

The beacon device **110** broadcasts a stream of individual location beacons using a wireless medium, such as BLUETOOTH, BLUETOOTH Low Energy (BTLE), Wi-Fi, or the like. The mobile device **115** is within RF range **111**, and thus, is able to receive the location beacons and take advantage of related services. In one embodiment, the beacons comprise IBEACONS defined by APPLE Computer of Cupertino, Calif. Other types of beacons can be used including IEEE 802.11 and other wireless protocol beacons. Beacons can include a unique identifier, along with a location, a time of transmission, and a packet sequence number. The unique identifier can be locally unique or globally unique and refer to a beacon device in and of itself, or to a host to which a beacon device is attached to or associated with.

The beacon device **110** can be implemented with a processor, a memory element and a transmitter in an enclosure. The enclosure can be attachable to a host using double sided tape, screws, Velcro, or the like. For example, a beacon device can have a small form factor and subtly attached to the rear panel of a television on display at an electronics store. In some implementations, the beacon device **110** is attached to a moving object, such as a train, causing the location to change over time.

The mobile device **115** is proximate to the beacon devices A,B can detect a stream of location beacons and scan for a unique identifier. In turn, the identifier is used to query a database or for an Internet search through network **199** to get further information. Returning to the example, a corner display of a television in an electronics store can automatically present specifications or a temporary coupon, retrieved

from a database record. In some cases, there is no additional information other than a location itself. The mobile device **115** can comprise a smartphone, a tablet device, a phablet device, a laptop computer, an automobile or any mobile computing device capable of receiving beacons (e.g., see FIG. 5). In one embodiment, mobile application or daemon is downloaded and installed on the mobile device **115**. In another embodiment, beacon scanning and processing is integrated within an operating system of the mobile device **115** (e.g., iPhones executing iOS7 by APPLE Computers of Cupertino, Calif.).

The spoofing beacon device **120** listens for beacons and transmits copies. Some location broadcasting services are unencrypted and particularly straightforward to spoof. The mobile device **115** is also within RF range **115** of the spoofing beacon device **120** which may operate for devious purposes. For example, the mobile device **115** can be sent to a web site showing derogatory information about a host associated with the beacon device **110**. Further, financial information can be compromised if a user of the mobile device **115** assumes the spoofing beacon device information to be legitimate.

The spoofing beacon device **120** can be implemented with a processor, a memory element, a receiver to listen for nearby location broadcasts, and additionally, a receiver to send out spoofed beacons.

The wireless networking device **130** detects the spoofed beacons by inserting dummy beacon streams into broadcasts. Broadcast beacons are referred to dummy beacons when there is no underlying purpose for streaming other than to detect spoofing. The broadcasted beacons are recorded in a table including a time, location, and packet sequence number. Table **300** of FIG. 3 is one sample of recordations. When spoofing is in process, the wireless networking device **130** will detect the copied and retransmitted beacons sent out by the spoofing beacon device **120**. As shown in FIG. 1, the spoofing beacon device **120** is within RF range **131** of the wireless networking device **130** in order to receive dummy beacons, and likewise, the wireless networking device **130** is within RF range **121** of spoofing beacon device **120** in order to receive spoofed beacons. A comparison of table entries having the same unique identification number and packet sequence number with a broadcast time and location matches for the broadcast stream originated by the wireless device **130**. However, the spoofing beacon device **120** rebroadcasts a packet stream, and thus, packets having the same unique identifier and sequence number will differ in broadcast time and location. Consequently, a comparison to table entries will reveal spoofed frames.

In an alternative embodiment, the wireless networking device **130** detects a spoofing device by listening to, and analyzing packet streams, without inserting any packets. To do so, unique identifiers between packets are matched, and then sequence numbers that are intended to be unique to a packet stream are matched between different packets. Multiple packets having the same sequence number is indicative of a copy. To further verify, broadcast time and locations are checked.

In response to the spoofing, the wireless networking device **130** can be configured to take various actions. In one instance, network administrator can be notified via SMS or e-mail, or the incident can be logged. In another instance, the wireless networking device **130** can jam the spoofing stream. In still another instance, a warning beacon stream can be inserted in order to caution end-users of the breach.

In one embodiment, the wireless networking device **130** is integrated with the beacon device **110**. In other words, spoofing is detected from a device that also serves to legitimately advertise a location. Thus, the broadcast stream is not a dummy stream and is self-cross-referenced with detected streams to detect spoofing. In some systems, a combination of the more expensive and complex hybrid devices are interspersed among lower costing and less complex stand-alone location broadcasters.

The wireless networking device **130** can be implemented in an access point, a smartphone, laptop, or the like (see e.g., FIG. 5). Additional embodiments of the wireless networking device **130** are set forth below in association with FIG. 2.

FIG. 2 is a more detailed block diagram illustrating a wireless networking device **130**, according to one embodiment. The wireless networking device **130** includes a controller **210**, a beacon generation module **220**, a beacon stream database **230**, a beacon comparison engine **240**, and an alert module **250**. The components can be implemented in hardware, software, or a combination of both.

The controller **210** calls various modules for spoofing detection, interfaces with an operating system, sends and receives beacon streams from a transceiver (not shown), can provide a user interface, and can spawn new instances when necessary. The beacon generation module **220** composes a dummy beacon stream according to a protocol such as BLUETOOTH or IEEE 802.11. The beacon stream database **230** stores the broadcast beacon stream along with data described herein. The beacon comparison engine **240** analyzes broadcast beacons against detected beacons to identify anomalies. The alert module **250** takes actions, as configured, upon discovery of spoofed beacons.

Methods for Detecting Spoof Attacks on Location Broadcasting Beacons (FIG. 4)

FIG. 4 is a high-level flow diagram illustrating a method **400** for detecting spoof attacks of location broadcasting beacons, according to one embodiment (e.g., by the wireless networking device **130** of FIG. 1). The method **400** non-limiting, as other processes can have more or fewer steps performed in a different order.

A stream of dummy beacons comprising at least a unique source identifier is generated (step **410**). The stream of beacons is broadcast over a wireless communication channel (step **420**). A list of broadcasted beacons is stored along with a time and location of broadcast (step **430**).

Subsequent to broadcasting, a stream of beacons is detected (step **440**). The detected beacon stream comprises at least a unique source identifier along with a time and a location of broadcast. The unique source identifier, the time and the location of at least one beacon of the detected beacon stream is compared to the unique source identifier, the time and the location of at least one beacon of the broadcast beacon stream (step **450**). Responsive to a match between the unique source identifiers and a mismatch of at least one of the time and locations, it may be determined that the broadcast beacon stream has been spoofed by the detected beacon stream (step **460**).

Generic Computing Device (FIG. 5)

FIG. 5 is a block diagram illustrating an exemplary computing device **900** for use in the system **100** of FIG. 1, according to one embodiment. The computing device **900** is an exemplary device that is implementable for each of the components of the system **100**, including the wireless networking device **130**. The computing device **500** can be a mobile computing device, a laptop device, a smartphone, a tablet device, a phablet device, a video game console, a personal computing device, a stationary computing device,

a server blade, an Internet appliance, a virtual computing device, a distributed computing device, a cloud-based computing device, or any appropriate processor-driven device.

The computing device **500**, of the present embodiment, includes a memory **510**, a processor **520**, a storage drive **530**, and an I/O port **540**. Each of the components is coupled for electronic communication via a bus **555**. Communication can be digital and/or analog, and use any suitable protocol.

The memory **510** further comprises network applications **512** and an operating system **514**. The network applications **520** can be the instant messenger application **210** and/or the instant messenger module **220**). Other network applications **512** can include a web browser, a mobile application, an application that uses networking, a remote application executing locally, a network protocol application, a network management application, a network routing application, or the like.

The operating system **514** can be one of the Microsoft Windows® family of operating systems (e.g., Windows 55, 58, Me, Windows NT, Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows XP x64 Edition, Windows Vista, Windows CE, Windows Mobile, Windows 5 or Windows 8), Linux, HP-UX, UNIX, Sun OS, Solaris, Mac OS X, Alpha OS, AIX, IRIX32, or IRIX64 . Other operating systems may be used. Microsoft Windows is a trademark of Microsoft Corporation.

The processor **520** can be a network processor (e.g., optimized for IEEE 802.11), a general purpose processor, an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a field programmable gate array (FPGA), a reduced instruction set controller (RISC) processor, an integrated circuit, or the like. Qualcomm Atheros, Broadcom Corporation, and Marvell Semiconductors manufacture processors that are optimized for IEEE 802.11 devices. The processor **520** can be single core, multiple core, or include more than one processing elements. The processor **520** can be disposed on silicon or any other suitable material. The processor **520** can receive and execute instructions and data stored in the memory **510** or the storage drive **530**.

The storage drive **530** can be any non-volatile type of storage such as a magnetic disc, EEPROM, Flash, or the like. The storage drive **530** stores code and data for applications.

The I/O port **540** further comprises a user interface **542** and a network interface **544**. The user interface **542** can output to a display device and receive input from, for example, a keyboard. The network interface **544** (e.g. RF antennae) connects to a medium such as Ethernet or Wi-Fi for data input and output.

Many of the functionalities described herein can be implemented with computer software, computer hardware, or a combination.

Computer software products (e.g., non-transitory computer products storing source code) may be written in any of various suitable programming languages, such as C, C++, C#, Oracle® Java, JavaScript, PHP, Python, Perl, Ruby, AJAX, and Adobe® Flash®. The computer software product may be an independent application with data input and data display modules. Alternatively, the computer software products may be classes that are instantiated as distributed objects. The computer software products may also be component software such as Java Beans (from Sun Microsystems) or Enterprise Java Beans (EJB from Sun Microsystems).

Furthermore, the computer that is running the previously mentioned computer software may be connected to a network and may interface to other computers using this

network. The network may be on an intranet or the Internet, among others. The network may be a wired network (e.g., using copper), telephone network, packet network, an optical network (e.g., using optical fiber), or a wireless network, or any combination of these. For example, data and other information may be passed between the computer and components (or steps) of a system of the invention using a wireless network using a protocol such as Wi-Fi (IEEE standards 802.11, 802.11a, 802.11b, 802.11e, 802.11g, 802.11i, 802.11n, and 802.11ac, just to name a few examples). For example, signals from a computer may be transferred, at least in part, wirelessly to components or other computers.

In an embodiment, with a Web browser executing on a computer workstation system, a user accesses a system on the World Wide Web (WWW) through a network such as the Internet. The Web browser is used to download web pages or other content in various formats including HTML, XML, text, PDF, and postscript, and may be used to upload information to other parts of the system. The Web browser may use uniform resource identifiers (URLs) to identify resources on the Web and hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) in transferring files on the Web.

This description of the invention has been presented for the purposes of illustration and description. It is not intended to be exhaustive or to limit the invention to the precise form described, and many modifications and variations are possible in light of the teaching above. The embodiments were chosen and described in order to best explain the principles of the invention and its practical applications. This description will enable others skilled in the art to best utilize and practice the invention in various embodiments and with various modifications as are suited to a particular use. The scope of the invention is defined by the following claims.

I claim:

1. A computer-implemented method in a wireless networking device for detecting spoof attacks of location broadcasting beacons, the method comprising the steps of:
  - generating a stream of beacons comprising at least a unique source identifier;
  - broadcasting the stream of beacons over a wireless communication channel;
  - storing a list of broadcasted beacons along with a time and location of broadcast;
  - subsequent to broadcasting, detecting a stream of beacons, the detected beacon stream comprising at least a unique source identifier along with a time and a location of broadcast;
  - comparing the unique source identifier, the time and the location of at least one beacon of the detected beacon stream to the unique source identifier, the time and the location of at least one beacon of the broadcast beacon stream; and
  - responsive to a match between the unique source identifiers and a mismatch of at least one of the time and locations, determining that the broadcast beacon stream has been spoofed by the detected beacon stream.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the stream of beacons and the detected stream of beacons both comprise IBEA-CONS.
3. The method of claim 1, wherein the wireless communication channel comprises a BLUETOOTH communication channel.
4. The method of claim 1, wherein the wireless communication channel comprises an IEEE 802.11 communication channel.



7

5. The method of claim 1, wherein the comparing the unique source identifier further comprises:

comparing a sequence number between the at least one beacon of the detected beacon stream and the at least one beacon of the broadcast beacon stream.

6. A non-transitory computer readable medium storing computer source code that, when executed by a processor, performs a method in a wireless networking device for detecting spoof attacks of location broadcasting beacons, the method comprising the steps of:

generating a stream of beacons comprising at least a unique source identifier;

broadcasting the stream of beacons over a wireless communication channel;

storing a list of broadcasted beacons along with a time and location of broadcast;

subsequent to broadcasting, detecting a stream of beacons, the detected beacon stream comprising at least a unique source identifier along with a time and a location of broadcast;

comparing the unique source identifier, the time and the location of at least one beacon of the detected beacon stream to the unique source identifier, the time and the location of at least one beacon of the broadcast beacon stream; and

responsive to a match between the unique source identifiers and a mismatch of at least one of the time and locations, determining that the broadcast beacon stream has been spoofed by the detected beacon stream.

7. The computer readable medium of claim 6, wherein in the method, the stream of beacons and the detected stream of beacons both comprise IBEACONS.

8. The computer readable medium of claim 6, wherein in the method, the wireless communication channel comprises a BLUETOOTH communication channel.

8

9. The computer readable medium of claim 6, wherein in the method, the wireless communication channel comprises an IEEE 802.11 communication channel.

10. The computer readable medium of claim 6, wherein in the method, the comparing the unique source identifier further comprises:

comparing a sequence number between the at least one beacon of the detected beacon stream and the at least one beacon of the broadcast beacon stream.

11. A wireless networking device for detecting spoof attacks of location broadcasting beacons, the wireless networking device comprising:

a processor;

a memory, comprising:

a first module to generate a stream of beacons comprising at least a unique source identifier;

a second module to broadcast the stream of beacons over a wireless communication channel;

a third module to store a list of broadcasted beacons along with a time and location of broadcast;

a fourth module to, subsequent to broadcasting, detect a stream of beacons, the detected beacon stream comprising at least a unique source identifier along with a time and a location of broadcast;

a fifth module to compare the unique source identifier, the time and the location of at least one beacon of the detected beacon stream to the unique source identifier, the time and the location of at least one beacon of the broadcast beacon stream; and

a sixth module to, responsive to a match between the unique source identifiers and a mismatch of at least one of the time and locations, determine that the broadcast beacon stream has been spoofed by the detected beacon stream.

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